题目：Maskin Meets Abreu and Matsushima
摘要：We study the classical Nash implementation problem due to Maskin (1999), but allow for the use of lottery and monetary transfer as in Abreu and Matsushima (1992, 1994). We therefore unify two well-established but somewhat orthogonal approaches of implementation theory. We first show that Maskin monotonicity is a necessary and sufficient condition for pure-strategy Nash implementation by a direct mechanism. Second, taking mixed strategies into consideration, we show that Maskin monotonicity is a necessary and sufficient condition for mixed-strategy Nash implementation by a finite (albeit indirect) mechanism. Third, we extend our analysis to implementation in rationalizable strategies. In contrast to previous papers, our approach possesses many appealing features simultaneously, e.g., finite mechanisms (with no integer or modulo game) are used; mixed strategies are handled explicitly; neither transfer nor bad outcomes are used on the equilibrium path; our mechanism is robust to information perturbations; and the size of off-equilibrium transfers can be made arbitrarily small. Finally, our result can be extended to continuous settings and ordinal settings.
主讲人简介：孙一飞，2015年毕业于新加坡国立大学 (National University of Singapore) ，经济学博士，现任教于对外经贸大学国际经济贸易学院。主要研究领域为微观经济学, 博弈论，产业组织理论，机制设计，实施理论。其近期论文发表于 Journal of Mathematical Economics等著名期刊。现开设产业经济学，高级产业组织理论等课程。