微观经济学workshop: Leave the Lights Dimmed: How Withholding Information Improves Matching on a P2P Platform?

发布日期:2019-01-03 10:44:37    来源:北京大学国家发展研究院

时间:2018年1月3日(周四)10:30-12:00  

地点:致福轩会议室

主讲人:雷莹

Title:

Leave the Lights Dimmed: How Withholding Information Improves Matching on a P2P Platform?

Abstract:
We consider a two-sided decentralized matching scenario on a P2P platform. Each of the agents on one side, called "senders'', sends an offer to one of the agents on the other side, called "receivers''. A match is successful if a receiver accepts an offer. Both senders and receivers are differentiated in two dimensions, a vertical attribute like quality and a horizontal attribute like location. The utility from a match increases with vertical quality and decreases with horizontal distance for both senders and receivers. We compare equilibrium strategies and welfare under different information display schemes. In addition, under the full information scheme, we also compare the decentralized and centralized matching in terms of user welfare.

Author's Bio:
雷莹,北京大学光华管理学院市场营销系助理教授。于2016年获得波士顿大学经济学博士学位。研究领域包括应用博弈论,机制设计,产业经济学,信息经济学等。目前研究兴趣包括公司竞争策略(广告、定价等),平台竞争,平台机制设计等。

 

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