作者：Yeon-Koo Che, Chongwoo Choe, Keeyoung Rhee
摘要：We develop a model of bailout stigma where accepting bailouts may signal firms’ financial troubles and weaken their subsequent funding capabilities. Bailout stigma can lead to low or even no take-up of otherwise attractive bailout offers, the failure of market revival, or a government having to pay a hefty premium to support market revival. Nonetheless, the stigma has a salutary effect: by refusing to accept bailouts, firms may rehabilitate their market perceptions, thereby improving their subsequent financing. Secret bailouts may not eliminate bailout stigma, but secrecy accompanied by restrictions on early market revival removes the stigma and achieves constrained efficiency.
个人简介（详见附件）: Keeyoung Rhee is a research fellow of Korea Development Institute (KDI) from 2015. He received his Ph.D. in Economics from Columbia University in 2015. His fields of interest are Applied Microeconomic Theory, Financial Economics, Political Economy.