**教育背景**

2016.9-至今 北京大学 国家发展研究院（CCER）管理学博士 （战略管理方向，导师：马浩教授）

2012.9-2016.7 四川大学 商学院 吴玉章荣誉学院 管理学学士（工商管理）

**研究方向**

战略变革，企业间关系，公司政治战略，竞合关系

**论文发表**

陈春花,尹俊,梅亮,韩夏.企业家如何应对环境不确定性?基于任正非采访实录的分析[J].**管理学报**,2020,17(08):1107-1116. (CSSCI)

韩夏, 马浩. 企业死亡研究纵览[J]. **外国经济与管理**, 2019, 41(6): 71-84. (CSSCI).

韩夏, 谢绚丽, 马浩. 业务退出研究综述：基于实物期权的探索[J]. **外国经济与管理**, 2019, 41(11): 114-135. (CSSCI).

**学术会议**

**2021年中国管理研究国际学会（IACMR）双年会**

Dynamic Coopetition Strategies: The Impacts of Ex ante and Ex post Heterogeneities.

**2020美国管理学年会（Academy of Management）**

Han, X., & Cai, G. 2020. Co-opetition Strategies: Alliance Formation, Value Creation and Value Capture. Paper presented to the Strategic Management Division at **the 80th Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management** in Vancouver, Canada (virtual meeting).

**2019美国管理学年会（Academy of Management）**

Han X, Xie X, Xi T., 2019. The Contingent Value of Political Connections: A Transaction Cost and Embeddedness Framework. Paper presented to the Strategic Management Division at **the 79th Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management** in Boston.

Han X, Cai G., 2019. Dynamic Coopetition Strategies: Why and How to Cooperate with Competitors? Paper presented to the Strategic Management Division at **the 79th Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management** in Boston.

**2019“中国制度经济学论坛”（广东 广州 中山大学）**

政府与市场：替代还是互补

**2019《管理学季刊》国际学术论坛（中国企业的可持续成长）（广东 广州 中山大学）**

如何与竞争者合作：一个竞合博弈的框架

**工作论文**

Han, X., Xi, T. & Xie, X. Does Owner Outperform Manager in Profiting from Political Connection? Agency, Embeddedness, and Political Uncertainty. Under Reject and Resubmit at ***Strategic Management Journal.***

Han, X., Chen, L & Tong, T. The Paradox of Relation-Specific Investment: Evidence from Customer-Supplier Relationships under Uncertainty Shocks. Ready for submission to ***Strategic Management Journal.***

Chen, C., Yin, J. & Han, X. Organizational Resilience in the Time of COVID-19: How to spur innovation under crises. Under preparation for submission to ***Harvard Business Review.***

Han, X. & Ma, H. Coping with Decline: Digitization by Traditional Economy Firms. Under preparation for submission to ***Business Horizon***.

Han, X. & Ma, H. Crisis and Turnaround: The Effects of Strategic Persistence. Under preparation for submission to ***Journal of Business Research***.

**助教经历**

2016-2017 春季学期 管理学workshop助管-谢绚丽

2017-2018秋季学期 北京大学国家发展研究院 经济学双学位 财务报表 课程助教-张昕

2017-2018 秋季学期 管理学workshop助管-吕晓慧

2017-2018 春季学期 管理学workshop 助管-谢绚丽

2019-2020春季学期：Digital Marketing，Influence and Negotiations课程助教（UCL MBA）

**获奖经历**

国家励志奖学金

中国工商银行奖学金优秀奖

北京大学博士生学业奖学金

**学术兼职**

美国管理学会（Academy of Management）会员

中国管理研究国际学会（IACMR）会员

会议评审, AOM Annual Conference

会议评审, IACMR 2020 Conference

**研究简介**

***1. The Paradox of Relation-Specific Investment: Evidence from Customer-Supplier Relationships under Uncertainty Shocks.***

***Abstract:*** Strategy research has long highlighted relation-specific assets as a key source of relational rents and competitive advantage. We instead reveal a potential dark side of relation-specific investment by showing how such investment may thwart customer firms’ responses to uncertainty shocks that afflict suppliers. When a supplier has made greater investment specific to a customer firm, the latter may become less inclined to change its sourcing behavior despite uncertainty, because relation-specific investment becomes a source of adjustment costs in strategic responses. Using a carefully-matched sample of customer-supplier relationships and a difference-in-differences design, we find that customer firms tend to reduce sourcing from a supplier that experiences a terrorist attack in its city. However, customer firms’ responses are impeded when the supplier has made greater relation-specific investment relative to other suppliers in the existing portfolio or other potential suppliers outside the portfolio. Our arguments and findings provide new insights for strategy research on relation-specific assets and adjustment costs.

***Keywords:*** Customer-supplier relationship, uncertainty shocks, relationship specific investments, adjustment costs, deferral option

***2.******Does Owner Outperform Manager in Profiting from Political Connection? Agency, Embeddedness, and Political Uncertainty***

***Abstract:*** The paper argues that agency structure is a key factor for understanding the value of political connection for firms. Under weak institutions, firms in which owners invest a personal relationship with political authorities obtain a higher degree of social embeddedness in the informal power networks and outperform those rely on hired managers to manage connections. However, personal connections through owners give rise to a high stake of dependence on political windfalls, rendering a vulnerability of deeply embedded firms. Using the Chinese listed firms as an empirical context, this paper finds that private firms featured with owner political connections have better records of performance than those maintained by managers. Such effects tend to vanish after 2012, due to the implementation of massive anti-corruption probes by the leadership of Chinese Communist Party, and are considerably neutralized for more sizable firms.

***Keywords:*** Owner versus manager political connection, political shock, social embeddedness

***3. Dynamic Coopetition Strategies: Why and How to Cooperate with Competitors?***

***Abstract:*** This paper studies dynamic strategies of firm cooperating with competitors, and considers the effects of both intrafirm heterogeneities and changing external environment. We assume that there are two firms, one with low level and the other with high level initial endowment and build a two-period, two-player game theoretical model. Firstly, we involve intrafirm attributes (initial endowment and asymmetries) as well as competitive tensions including potential market share and its growth to study their single and interactive effects on coopetition strategies of each firm. Secondly, taking learning effects (absolute and relative) into account, we further figure out dynamics of cooperation strategies and their boundary conditions. Finally, under non-cooperative and cooperative game framework, we combine coopetition strategies of both firms to find out Nash-equilibriums in each context. Our model attempts to provide explanations for why and how different types of firms should cooperate with their competitors.

***Keywords:*** Coopetition, competitive tensions, dynamic strategies, learning effects

***4. Co-opetition Strategies: Alliance Formation, Value Creation and Value Capture***

***Abstract：***This paper studies how firms’ productivity outside the alliance (outside option), resource complementarity (synergy effect) and the cost of resource allocation influence their common value creation and value capture strategies in the co-opetition alliance, and further affect alliance formation and termination decisions. We develop a three-stage game-theoretic model and find that first, although the improvement of outside option encourages a firm to allocate more resources on common value capture, it would result in less bargaining power in the alliance due to its partner’s escalated value capture efforts as a response. Second, as the outside option improves, the strong firm tends to allocate more resources for common value creation, while the weak firm tends to “free ride” and allocate less resources to the alliance. Therefore, as the gap between firms’ outside option increases, it becomes harder for firms to form the alliance. Third, we find that synergy effects will not always play a positive role on alliance formation, showing a “non-linear” relationship. Once it reaches the alliance formation threshold, the larger synergy effects, the less resources both firms will contribute to the alliance. On the contrary, the resource allocation cost serves as a valuable commitment and positively influences firms’ resources allocation for both common value creation and value capture after alliance formation. Finally, we provide additional comparative static analyses to shed lights on mechanisms through which these factors would affect firms’ co-opetition incentives.

***Keywords:*** Co-opetition strategies; alliance formation and termination; value creation; value capture; outside option

***5. Digitalization by Traditional Economy Firm***

***Abstract：***Many firms in the traditional economy are trying to embrace digitalization in order to cope with the decline brought to them by the onslaught of the digital economy. This paper examines the determinants of such digitalization of these firms by integrating concerned literatures from management and economics. In general, the characteristics of the firms’ businesses in terms of the economic cycles they are in, their task decomposability, and their product/service/transaction mode substitutability have direct impacts on the necessity of digitalization as well as the feasibility of digitalization, which jointly determine the actual status of digitalization, as reflected in the speed, scope, and magnitude of digitalization. Moreover, contextual variables such as institutional legitimacy, competitive intensity, and technological diffusion moderate the relationship between firm characteristics and digitalization. Furthermore, both ordinary capabilities and dynamic capabilities of the firms moderate their digitalization.

***Keywords:*** Digitalization; decline; economic cycles; task decomposability; substitutability; dynamic capabilities