

QIAN ZHANG

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EDUCATION

- | | |
|---|------------------------------------|
| National School of Development(CCER), Peking University
<i>PhD of Western Economics with Concentration in Political Economics</i> | Beijing
Sept. 2015 - Present |
| 21st Century China Center, University of California
<i>Visiting Scholar</i> | San Diego
Aug. 2018 - Aug. 2019 |
| School of Economics, Xiamen University
<i>Bachelor of Public Finance with Concentration in Fiscal Decentralization</i> | Xiamen
Sept. 2011 - Jun. 2015 |
| School of Mathematical Sciences, Xiamen University
<i>Bachelor of Mathematics with Concentration in Economic Mathematics</i> | Xiamen
Mar. 2012 - Jun. 2015 |
| Outstanding Students Training Program, Xiamen University
<i>Selected 10 students from 600 candidates</i> | Xiamen
Nov. 2011 - Jun. 2015 |

RESEARCH INTERESTS

Political Economy in China, Public Finance

PUBLICATION IN CHINESE

- Selection, Training and Incentivizing —Evidence from the CCER Officials Dataset.Joint with Yang Yao et al.. 2020. China Economic Quarterly (in Chinese). 中文：“选拔、培养和激励：来自1994-2017年市级主官的证据”，合作者：姚洋等，《经济学(季刊)》，2020(03).
- Fiscal Decentralization and Regional Economic Growth in China, joint with Ming Deng. 2017. Journal of Macro-quality Research(in Chinese).中文：“财政分权与中国地区经济增长质量”，合作者：邓明，《宏观质量研究》，2017(03).

WORKING PAPERS

- Purifying the Leviathan: The Anticorruption Campaign and Governance Models in China(with Tianyang Xi and Yang Yao) Under Review
- To Build a Clean Government, the Structure of Trust in Government: Based on the Analysis of Public Donation Data for COVID-19 in China(in Chinese). 中文：“廉政建设与政府信任的结构——基于新冠疫情下公众捐款数据的分析”
2020 中国社会科学院第十三届中国廉政研究论坛优秀论文二等奖

WORKS IN PROGRESS

- Greasing the Wheels(with Yang Yao)
- Corruption v.s. Promotion(with Junyan Jiang, Tianyang Xi and Yang Yao)

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Teaching Assistant

Peking University

- Politics, Philosophy and Economics(Undergraduate) *Fall 2019*
- Financial and Managerial Accounting(PKU-UCL MBA) *Fall 2019*
- Corporate Finance(PKU-UCL MBA) *Spring 2018*
- Seminars in China's Public Finance(Graduate) *Fall 2016*
- Current Researches in China's Public Finance(Undergraduate) *Fall 2016*

Research Assistant

- Young Economist of CF40 *Oct. 2019 - Present*
- Institute of Industrial Economics of CASS *Mar. 2016 - Sept. 2016*

HONORS AND AWARDS

- Certificates of Study and Practice of Teaching Assistant Training Program in English *2020*
- Excellent Teaching Assistant *2017*
- Founder Scholarship *2016*
- Outstanding Graduate of Xiamen University *2015*
- National Scholarship *2014*
- Merit Student *2012,2013,2014*

SKILLS AND ABILITY

Computer Skills Language

Python, Stata, L^AT_EX ,R, ArcGIS, Gephi
Mandarin Chinese (native), English(fluent)

REFERENCES

Yang Yao

- Professor of Economics
- National School of Department, Peking University
- Email: yyao@nsd.pku.edu.cn

Shuanglin Lin

- Professor of Economics
- Director of Peking University China Center for Public Finance, Peking University
- Email: shuanglin@nsd.pku.edu.cn

Tianyang Xi

- Assistant Professor of Political Science
- National School of Department, Peking University
- Email: tyxi@nsd.pku.edu.cn

Purifying the Leviathan: The Anticorruption Campaign and Governance Models in China (with Tianyang Xi and Yang Yao)

Abstract: Authoritarian regimes differ considerably in their tolerance for political corruption. This paper develops a strategic account of authoritarian governance over corruption, which argues that political survival of the ruler depends on popular support and a cohesive ruling coalition to maintain growth and political loyalty. Corruption is useful for coalition-building, but it undermines popular support and political loyalty. In turn, the ruler may switch from a permissive scheme to a punitive scheme for governance to preempt the institutional decay caused by corruption. Consistent with this argument, empirical investigations on the recent anticorruption campaign in China documents a positive correlation between officials' capability and the probability of investigation, as well as an increasing pandering to the party line among city leaders who were promoted during the campaign.

廉政建设与政府信任的结构——基于新冠疫情下公众捐款数据的分析

摘要: 以往文献没有对廉政建设如何影响政府信任达成共识, 主要原因是使用的调查数据不同, 主观评价的稳定性差、随机性大, 很难反映真实的偏好。本文收集整理湖北省及其管辖范围内17个地市、省直县官方指定接受新冠疫情捐赠的32个主体从2020年1月24日至2月24日的收入和支出数据, 用有成本的客观数据可以避免主观评价带来的问题, 最大限度反映公众的真实偏好。通过固定面板效应回归分析, 本文发现, 廉政建设会迅速提高组织的政府信任水平, 但短期内不会改变个人的政府信任水平; 对提高的政府信任来源进行分析发现, 主要来源是少部分人的高信任, 而不是大多数人普遍增加信任。文章的发现对于提高政府信任的路径选择有重要的意义。

张倩

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教育背景

2015.9-至今	北京大学国家发展研究院 经济学博士（导师：姚洋、席天扬）
2018.8-2019.8	加州大学圣地亚哥分校 访问学者，研究方向：政治经济学
2011.9-2015.6	厦门大学经济学院 经济学、数学双学士学位

研究领域

新政治经济学、财政学

论文发表

“选拔、培养和激励：来自 1994-2017 年市级主官的证据”，合作者：姚洋等，《*经济学(季刊)*》，2020(03).
“财政分权与中国地区经济增长质量”，合作者：邓明，《*宏观质量研究*》，2017(03).

工作论文

“**Purifying the Leviathan: The Anticorruption Campaign and Governance Models in China**” (with Tianyang Xi and Yang Yao).

Abstract: Authoritarian regimes differ considerably in their tolerance for political corruption. This paper develops a strategic account of authoritarian governance over corruption, which argues that political survival of the ruler depends on popular support and a cohesive ruling coalition to maintain growth and political loyalty. Corruption is useful for coalition-building, but it undermines popular support and political loyalty. In turn, the ruler may switch from a permissive scheme to a punitive scheme for governance to preempt the institutional decay caused by corruption. Consistent with this argument, empirical investigations on the recent anticorruption campaign in China documents a positive correlation between officials' capability and the probability of investigation, as well as an increasing pandering to the party line among city leaders who were promoted during the campaign.

“**廉政建设与政府信任的结构——基于新冠疫情下公众捐款数据的分析**”（获 中国社会科学院第十三届中国廉政研究论坛优秀论文二等奖）

摘要：以往文献没有对廉政建设如何影响政府信任达成共识，主要原因是使用的调查数据不同，主观评价的稳定性差、随机性大，很难反映真实的偏好。本文收集整理了湖北省及其管辖范围内 17 个地市、省直县官方指定接受新冠疫情捐赠的 32 个主体从 2020 年 1 月 24 日至 2 月 24 日的收入和支出数据，用有成本的客观数据避免主观评价带来的问题，最大限度反映公众的真实偏好。通过固定面板效应回归分析，本文发现，廉政建设会迅速提高组织的政府信任水平，但短期内不会改变个人的政府信任水平；对提高的政府信任来源进行分析发现，主要来源是少部分人的高信任，而不是大多数人普遍增加信任。文章的发现对于提高政府信任的路径选择有重要的意义。

研究、助教经历

2019-至今	中国金融四十人论坛 青年研究员
2019 秋季	“经济和政治哲学”（姚洋老师）助教
2019 秋季	“Financial and Managerial Accounting(PKU-UCL MBA)”（Michael Manlangit）助教
2018 春季	“Corporate Finance(PKU-UCL MBA)”（Alan Parkinson）助教
2016 秋季	“中国财政前沿问题”、“中国财政专题”（林双林老师）助教
2016.3-9	中国社会科学院工业经济研究所研究助理

奖励荣誉

2020	北大英文授课课程助教培训项目学习证书和实践证书
2017	北京大学优秀助教
2016	北京大学方正奖学金
2015	厦门大学优秀毕业生
2014	厦门大学国家奖学金

个人信息

软件技能：熟练使用 Python, Stata, L^AT_EX, R, ArcGIS, Gephi
语言水平：英语流利