讲座时间：12月16日 讲座地点：国发院中心小教室 主讲人： Dr. Zaifu Yang Professor of Economics and Chair in Economics Director, Center for Mechanism and Institution Design Department of Economic and Related Studies University of York 主持老师：汪浩，张晓波，席天扬，李力行   Decentralised Random Competitive Dynamic Market Processes By Zaifu Yang   Abstract: We study a decentralised uncoordinated market where heterogeneous self-interested firms and workers meet directly and randomly in pursuit of higher payoff over time. Each firm can hire multiple workers. Each worker has preferences over firms and salaries but works for at most one firm. Neither firms nor workers possess perfect knowledge of the market. At any time any firm and any group of workers can form a new coalition if doing so makes no member of the coalition worse off and at least one member strictly better off. In this process, the firm may recruit workers from other firms and dismiss some of its own workers, the deserted firms and fired workers can be worse off. This process is called the coalition improvement. We establish that starting from an arbitrary market state of a matching between firms and workers with a system of salaries, a decentralised, random, spontaneous dynamic market process where each possible coalition improvement occurs with a positive probability converges with probability one to a competitive equilibrium of the market, thus resulting in an efficient allocation of resources. This theorem is built upon a crucial mathematical result which shows the existence of a finite sequence of successive coalition improvements from an arbitrary market state to equilibrium. Our results have meaningful economic policy implications.