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[11月7日]宏观经济学workshop
发布日期：2014-11-07 02:41 来源：北京大学国家发展研究院
时间：11月7日10:00-11:30
地点：致福轩教室
标题：Optimal Tax Progressivity: An Analytical Framework
演讲嘉宾: Kjetil Storesletten
主持：赵波、王敏
嘉宾简介：Kjetil Storesletten joined the Department of Economics University of Oslo as a professor in 2003. During 2009-2012 he was a Monetary Advisor at the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, and from 1995 through 2003 he was an assistant professor at the Institute for International Economic Studies at Stockholm University. Kjetil has been a visiting professor at University of Zurich and a Research Fellow at CEPR and the Frisch Centre (Oslo). He was a managing editor of the Review of Economic Studies during the period 2006-2010, and he is currently the chairman of the same journal. Since 2012 he has been the editor of the Scandinavian Journal of Economics. He is a regular op-ed contributor to Dagens Næringsliv, the main Norwegian business newspaper. He is currently holding an Advanced Grant from the European Research Council. Kjetil studied economics at the Norwegian School of Economics and business administration and mathematics at Agder University College in Norway. He received his Ph.D. in economics from the Graduate School of Industrial Administration, Carnegie Mellon University, in 1995. His research focuses on quantitative macroeconomics, transition economics, political economy, labor economics, risk sharing, asset pricing, and immigration. Kjetil’s work has appeared in numerous journals, among them the Journal of Political Economy, American Economic Review, Econometrica, Journal of Monetary Economics, Review of Economic Dynamics, and Journal of Economic Theory. He was awarded an Outstanding Young Investigator grant from the Norwegian Science Foundation. He is one of the first two Europeans to receive the Sun-Yefang prize, the highest Chinese award for economists writing on China.
报告摘要：What shapes the optimal degree of progressivity of the tax and transfer system? On the one hand, a progressive tax system can counteract inequality in initial conditions and substitute for imperfect private insurance against idiosyncratic earnings risk. At the same time, progressivity reduces incentives to work and to invest in skills, and aggravates the externality associated to valued public expenditures. We develop a tractable equilibrium model that features all these trade-offs. The analytical expressions we derive for social welfare deliver a transparent understanding of how preferences, technology, and market structure parameters influence the optimal degree of progressivity. A calibration for the U.S. economy indicates that endogenous skill investment, flexible labor supply, and the externality linked to valued government purchases play quantitatively similar roles in limiting desired progressivity.
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首页
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[11月7日]宏观经济学workshop
发布日期：2014-11-07 02:41 来源：北京大学国家发展研究院
时间：11月7日10:00-11:30
地点：致福轩教室
标题：Optimal Tax Progressivity: An Analytical Framework
演讲嘉宾: Kjetil Storesletten
主持：赵波、王敏
嘉宾简介：Kjetil Storesletten joined the Department of Economics University of Oslo as a professor in 2003. During 2009-2012 he was a Monetary Advisor at the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, and from 1995 through 2003 he was an assistant professor at the Institute for International Economic Studies at Stockholm University. Kjetil has been a visiting professor at University of Zurich and a Research Fellow at CEPR and the Frisch Centre (Oslo). He was a managing editor of the Review of Economic Studies during the period 2006-2010, and he is currently the chairman of the same journal. Since 2012 he has been the editor of the Scandinavian Journal of Economics. He is a regular op-ed contributor to Dagens Næringsliv, the main Norwegian business newspaper. He is currently holding an Advanced Grant from the European Research Council. Kjetil studied economics at the Norwegian School of Economics and business administration and mathematics at Agder University College in Norway. He received his Ph.D. in economics from the Graduate School of Industrial Administration, Carnegie Mellon University, in 1995. His research focuses on quantitative macroeconomics, transition economics, political economy, labor economics, risk sharing, asset pricing, and immigration. Kjetil’s work has appeared in numerous journals, among them the Journal of Political Economy, American Economic Review, Econometrica, Journal of Monetary Economics, Review of Economic Dynamics, and Journal of Economic Theory. He was awarded an Outstanding Young Investigator grant from the Norwegian Science Foundation. He is one of the first two Europeans to receive the Sun-Yefang prize, the highest Chinese award for economists writing on China.
报告摘要：What shapes the optimal degree of progressivity of the tax and transfer system? On the one hand, a progressive tax system can counteract inequality in initial conditions and substitute for imperfect private insurance against idiosyncratic earnings risk. At the same time, progressivity reduces incentives to work and to invest in skills, and aggravates the externality associated to valued public expenditures. We develop a tractable equilibrium model that features all these trade-offs. The analytical expressions we derive for social welfare deliver a transparent understanding of how preferences, technology, and market structure parameters influence the optimal degree of progressivity. A calibration for the U.S. economy indicates that endogenous skill investment, flexible labor supply, and the externality linked to valued government purchases play quantitatively similar roles in limiting desired progressivity.
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