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北京大学国家发展研究院

[11月14日]宏观经济学workshop

发布日期：2014-11-14 02:41    来源：北京大学国家发展研究院

宏观经济学workshop(八）
时间：11月14日10:00-11:30
地点：512教室
标题：Equilibrium Matching and Termination （与王城合作）
演讲嘉宾：杨有智

主持：王敏

嘉宾简介：

杨有智2009毕业于美国爱荷华州立大学，现在为上海财经大学经济系助理教授，主要研究方向为合约理论和宏观经济学。

文章摘要：In an equilibrium model of the labor market with moral hazard, jobs are dynamic contracts, job separations are terminations of optimal dynamic contracts, and terminations are used both as an incentive device and as a means for minimizing the cost of compensation. Transitions from unemployment to new jobs are modeled as a process of random matching and Nash bargaining. Non-employed workers make consumption and saving decisions as in a standard growth model, but they must also decide whether or not to participate in the labor market. The stationary equilibrium of the model is characterized. We then calibrate the model to the U.S. labor market to study quantitatively the worker flows and distributions, and the compensation dynamics.


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