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北京大学国家发展研究院

[11月25日]国际经济学workshop

发布日期：2014-11-25 02:34    来源：北京大学国家发展研究院

国际经济学workshop 时间：11月25日上午10:30-12:00 地点：国发院512会议室 主讲人：陈庆池，复旦大学经济学院 Does Majority Rule Produce Hasty Decisions? Abstract. We study a model of collective decision-making and learning where agents differ in their preferences toward which alternative to adopt and how quickly to act. Impatient agents are attractive allies if some agents want to stop learning to adopt their favored alternative. Competition for impatient agents’ votes can produce hasty decisions through strategic complementarity. Majority rule is not robust in that one very impatient agent can cause the whole group to rush to a decision. Super-majority rule may avoid this problem, but may allow a minority with extreme preferences to hold out and impose their favored alternative on the majority.


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