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发展经济学workshop:Do Land Revenue Windfalls Create A Political Resource Curse? Evidence from China by Ting Chen and James Kai-sing Kung

发布日期：2015-10-21 02:42    来源：北京大学国家发展研究院

发展经济学workshop

主讲人：陈婷，香港科技大学  
Do Land Revenue Windfalls Create A Political Resource Curse? Evidence from China by Ting Chen and James Kai-sing Kung
主持教师：张晓波，席天扬，李力行
上课时间：10月21 日(周三)下午2:00-3:30
上课地点：国发院万众楼小教室
助教邮箱：zhuwu0513@163.com
 
Abstract: By analyzing a panel on the political turnovers of 4,390 county leaders in China during 1999-2008, we find that the revenue windfalls accrued to these officials from land sales have both undermined the effectiveness of the promotion system for government officials and fueled corruption. Instead of rewarding efforts made to boost GDP growth, promotion is also positively correlated with signaling efforts, with those politically connected to their superiors and those beyond the prime age for promotion being the primary beneficiaries. Likewise, land revenue windfalls have led to increases in the size of bureaucracy and administrative expenditure—corruption in short

 


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