Toggle topbar
北京大学国家发展研究院

微观经济学workshop:Information Spillover and Delay in Multi-good Adverse Selection

发布日期：2017-09-28 09:35    来源：北京大学国家发展研究院

时间：2017年9月28日（周四）14:00-15:30

地点：北京大学致福轩会议室

主讲人：皇甫秉超  Bingchao Huangfu（中南财经政法大学文澜学院助理教授）

主持人：汪浩、胡岠

题目：Information Spillover and Delay in Multi-good Adverse Selection

(coauthored with Heng Liu )

摘要：This paper analyzes the effect of information spillover in a multigood adverse selection model.In the canonical setting, a privately informed seller simultaneously engages in trading two different goods with different buyers. Since the seller’s private information about the surplus is multidimensional in nature, buyers not only learn the seller’s information from past trading outcomes in the market they participate, they may also learn from transactions in the other market, which is referred to as “information spillover”. We fully characterize the equilibria of this model and identify a “beneficial spillover” condition under which the efficiency loss due to adverse selection reduces: under this condition, trade occurs faster than the case without information spillover, even though delays may occur in equilibrium; when this condition fails, the efficiency loss is the same as in the case without information spillover. Our findings provide a link between the signaling effect in the standard dynamic adverse selection and the ratchet effect in repeated bargaining.

主讲人简介：中南财经政法大学文澜学院助理教授。复旦大学金融学学士、硕士，University of Rochester经济学博士，现任中南财经政法大学文澜学院助理教授，主要研究领域为：Dynamic Games, Bargaining, Reputation, Industrial Organization。

主讲人主页：https://bingchaohuangfu.weebly.com/


分享到：
朗润

国家发展研究院官方微信

国家发展研究院官方微信
点击关注点击关注

相关链接

Copyright© 1994-2012 北京大学 国家发展研究院 版权所有, 京ICP备05065075号-1
保留所有权利，不经允许请勿挪用