微观经济学workshop:Bundled Procurement

发布日期:2017-04-13 01:49    来源:北京大学国家发展研究院

微观经济学workshop: Bundled Procurement

 

时间:2017年4月13日(周四)14:00-15:30   

地点:北京大学朗润园万众楼小教室

主讲人:李建培(对外经济贸易大学经济学教授)


题目:Bundled Procurement

摘要:When procuring multiple products from competing sellers, a buyer may choose separate purchase, pure bundling, or mixed bundling. We show that pure bundling maximizes buyer surplus when there are two sellers and trade for each good is likely efficient, whereas separate purchase can be optimal for the buyer when there are more sellers or one of the goods has a low probability of trade. We explain how these results are related to the reduction of sellers' cost dispersion and the potential "adverse tying" under bundling. Remarkably, mixed bundling is dominated under procurement, in contrast to the finding under monopoly bundled sales.

主讲人简介:对外经济贸易大学经济学教授。1997年获北京科技大学英语学士学位,2003年获柏林洪堡大学经济学和管理科学硕士学位,2007年获柏林洪堡大学经济学博士学位。研究方向是运用微观,产业组织,和契约理论。在RAND Journal of Economics、Journal of Public Economics、Journal of Economic Theory等经济学一流期刊上发表多篇论文。
主讲人主页:http://site.uibe.edu.cn/actionszdw/ViewTeacher.aspx?NewsID=156

 


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