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能源经济学workshop
发布日期：2016-12-12 11:10 来源：北京大学国家发展研究院
题目： Self-enforcing International Environmental Agreements: The Role of Climate Tipping
报告人：刘馨 (中科院科技咨询战略研究院)
时间： 2016年12月12日（周一） 9:00-10:30
地点：北大国发院/中国经济研究中心小教室
摘要： International environmental agreements (IEAs) can be an important way to increase the efficiency of emission abatement and climate change mitigation. This paper investigates the effect of possible tipping events, which would bring catastrophic and irreversible damage to the ecological system and human society, on individual countries’ emission decisions and the stable size of IEAs in various scenarios, using a game-theoretic model. The results show that if the CO2 concentration threshold for triggering the tipping events is high, the possibility of climate tipping would have no effect on size of IEAs. However, if the threshold for tipping is low, the climate system would not pass the tipping point for the case with a high post-tipping damage, while it would pass the tipping point for the case with a low post-tipping damage. Moreover, the effect of possible tipping events on the size of coalition would change if the signatories’ coalition has the first-mover advantage, the possibility of tipping would increase the size of coalition. Otherwise, and the possibility of tipping would decrease the size of IEAs.
报告人简介： 刘馨，中国科学院科技咨询战略研究院在读博士。研究领域是能源与环境经济学，主要研究方向是不可再生资源的管理及国际间合作，国际气候协议的签署问题，动态博弈的应用及项目中不同利益相关方间的收益-风险分担问题等。
题目：Two Mathematical Versions of the Coase Theorem
报告人：赵进钢 (国发院访问教授，加拿大萨省大学经济学教授)
时间： 2016年12月12日（周一） 10:30-12:00
地点：北大国发院/中国经济研究中心小教室
摘要： This paper fixes the purported empty-core problem of the Coase theorem by establishing two mathematical versions of the Coase theorem. The simpler version says that in a coalitional production economy without transaction costs, the maximal payoffs will be produced by the optimal firms and will be split within the always non-empty (new) core. The mathematical model for this theorem yields the smallest upper bound of transaction costs below which the monopoly is optimal and thus be formed.
报告人简介：赵进钢本科毕业于北京航天航空大学数学系(77级)、硕士毕业于中国人民大学数量经济学专业(81级)，博士毕业于耶鲁大学经济系 (92年)，现任加拿大萨省大学经济学教授,本学期在国发院为博士生讲授产业组织。他在博弈论、产业组织等领域取得多项创建性成果。他创建的分合解 (hybrid solution)包含纳什均衡和合作解两个特例。分合博弈、网络博弈和信息经济学(hybrid game，network game and information economics)曾被美国经济协会的期刊(Journal of Economic Perspective)在2000年预测为21世纪微观经济理论的重要前沿课题。他开创用合作博弈分析企业兼并，首次提出非空核(nonempty core)为兼并的先决条件，使非空核和盈利能力(profitability)并列成为研究兼并等企业合作行为的两大基石。基于这些前沿性成果，他应邀为即将出版的《博弈论和产业组织手册》撰写了一章,即，“可转让效用的垄断博弈与工业合作”（TU Oligopoly Games and Industrial Cooperation,in Corchon and Marini (Ed), Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization， Edward Elgar, 2017）。
论文： Two Coase Ths
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-
首页
-
能源经济学workshop
发布日期：2016-12-12 11:10 来源：北京大学国家发展研究院
题目： Self-enforcing International Environmental Agreements: The Role of Climate Tipping
报告人：刘馨 (中科院科技咨询战略研究院)
时间： 2016年12月12日（周一） 9:00-10:30
地点：北大国发院/中国经济研究中心小教室
摘要： International environmental agreements (IEAs) can be an important way to increase the efficiency of emission abatement and climate change mitigation. This paper investigates the effect of possible tipping events, which would bring catastrophic and irreversible damage to the ecological system and human society, on individual countries’ emission decisions and the stable size of IEAs in various scenarios, using a game-theoretic model. The results show that if the CO2 concentration threshold for triggering the tipping events is high, the possibility of climate tipping would have no effect on size of IEAs. However, if the threshold for tipping is low, the climate system would not pass the tipping point for the case with a high post-tipping damage, while it would pass the tipping point for the case with a low post-tipping damage. Moreover, the effect of possible tipping events on the size of coalition would change if the signatories’ coalition has the first-mover advantage, the possibility of tipping would increase the size of coalition. Otherwise, and the possibility of tipping would decrease the size of IEAs.
报告人简介： 刘馨，中国科学院科技咨询战略研究院在读博士。研究领域是能源与环境经济学，主要研究方向是不可再生资源的管理及国际间合作，国际气候协议的签署问题，动态博弈的应用及项目中不同利益相关方间的收益-风险分担问题等。
题目：Two Mathematical Versions of the Coase Theorem
报告人：赵进钢 (国发院访问教授，加拿大萨省大学经济学教授)
时间： 2016年12月12日（周一） 10:30-12:00
地点：北大国发院/中国经济研究中心小教室
摘要： This paper fixes the purported empty-core problem of the Coase theorem by establishing two mathematical versions of the Coase theorem. The simpler version says that in a coalitional production economy without transaction costs, the maximal payoffs will be produced by the optimal firms and will be split within the always non-empty (new) core. The mathematical model for this theorem yields the smallest upper bound of transaction costs below which the monopoly is optimal and thus be formed.
报告人简介：赵进钢本科毕业于北京航天航空大学数学系(77级)、硕士毕业于中国人民大学数量经济学专业(81级)，博士毕业于耶鲁大学经济系 (92年)，现任加拿大萨省大学经济学教授,本学期在国发院为博士生讲授产业组织。他在博弈论、产业组织等领域取得多项创建性成果。他创建的分合解 (hybrid solution)包含纳什均衡和合作解两个特例。分合博弈、网络博弈和信息经济学(hybrid game，network game and information economics)曾被美国经济协会的期刊(Journal of Economic Perspective)在2000年预测为21世纪微观经济理论的重要前沿课题。他开创用合作博弈分析企业兼并，首次提出非空核(nonempty core)为兼并的先决条件，使非空核和盈利能力(profitability)并列成为研究兼并等企业合作行为的两大基石。基于这些前沿性成果，他应邀为即将出版的《博弈论和产业组织手册》撰写了一章,即，“可转让效用的垄断博弈与工业合作”（TU Oligopoly Games and Industrial Cooperation,in Corchon and Marini (Ed), Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization， Edward Elgar, 2017）。
论文： Two Coase Ths
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