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发展经济学workshop:China’s Housing Supply: Fiscal Motivation
发布日期：2016-09-28 09:19 来源：北京大学国家发展研究院
时间：2016年9月28日13:30-3:00
地点：国家发展研究院万众楼一楼小教室
主讲人：袁宇菲
Title: China’s Housing Supply: Fiscal Motivation
Abstract: China has a unique land use regulation ensuring that local governments are the only legal suppliers of the leasehold rights of the residential lands. The cur- rent literature has very limited research on how such regulation influences housing supply. We first set up the theoretical analysis about how the land supply is deter- mined based on the assumption that local governments target at maximizing the revenues of land transfer fees. We find that when there are expected changes of future housing demand, the supply of residential lands deviates from simple mo- nopolism and especially, the fast-growing cities tend to put more constraints on the supply of residential lands. We then take the transaction data from the primary market of urban residential lands (2004-2015) and find the empirical supports for the qualitative conclusions. We further check the cross-sectional allocation of house constructions across the cities, and find that there is resource mis-allocation across cities in that the cities of higher rent growth have lower growth of future housing supply compared with those of lower rent growth.
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发展经济学workshop:China’s Housing Supply: Fiscal Motivation
发布日期：2016-09-28 09:19 来源：北京大学国家发展研究院
时间：2016年9月28日13:30-3:00
地点：国家发展研究院万众楼一楼小教室
主讲人：袁宇菲
Title: China’s Housing Supply: Fiscal Motivation
Abstract: China has a unique land use regulation ensuring that local governments are the only legal suppliers of the leasehold rights of the residential lands. The cur- rent literature has very limited research on how such regulation influences housing supply. We first set up the theoretical analysis about how the land supply is deter- mined based on the assumption that local governments target at maximizing the revenues of land transfer fees. We find that when there are expected changes of future housing demand, the supply of residential lands deviates from simple mo- nopolism and especially, the fast-growing cities tend to put more constraints on the supply of residential lands. We then take the transaction data from the primary market of urban residential lands (2004-2015) and find the empirical supports for the qualitative conclusions. We further check the cross-sectional allocation of house constructions across the cities, and find that there is resource mis-allocation across cities in that the cities of higher rent growth have lower growth of future housing supply compared with those of lower rent growth.
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