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国际经济学workshop:Revolving door regulation and its impact on Chinese listed firms
发布日期：2016-04-27 08:56 来源：北京大学国家发展研究院
Seminar on International Economics
时间：2016年4月27日（周三）10：30－12：00 am
地点：北大国发院/中国经济研究中心512教室
主持人：余淼杰、余昌华
主讲人：Xiaoning Long 龙小宁 Xiamen University
题目：Revolving door regulation and its impact on Chinese listed firms
摘要：The recent Document No. 18 in China forbids current and retired government officials to hold paid positions in firms and we conduct multiple empirical tests to study the impact of revolving door regulation on Chinese listed firms.
A survival analysis shows that the regulation increased the daily departure rate of independent directors who are targeted officials by 38%. More importantly, an event study based on stock prices of listed firms shows that: (1) The abnormal rate of return for
firms impacted by Document No. 18 is significantly lower than that for other firms, and the drop becomes larger when the window length increases, with the cumulative abnormal rate of return exceeding 3.6% 120 days after the document's issuance; (2) The significant impact of Document 18 on listed firms is observed for both government officials and officials working in universities, implying that the linkage between government and firms has permeated throughout the various sectors in China; and, (3) When dividing official independent directors by their official rankings, government officials affiliated with the People's congress and the Political Consultative Commission are associated with larger effects of Document 18, while university officials with higher rankings tend to experience greater impact.
Finally, we explore how Document 18 affects firm financial performance. Our study produces evidence that sales growth is slower and loan quantity smaller for firms impacted by the document, while R&D expenditure has increased for these firms. These longer-term results suggest that the revolving door regulation may have been effective in cutting off political connections between firms and government and prompting firms to rely more on their own innovation capacity. Combined together, our findings contrast the short-run versus long-run effects of the on-going anti-corruption campaign in China.
主讲人简介：Xiaoning Long 龙小宁现为厦门大学王亚南研究院和经济学院双骋经济学教授，“长江学者”特聘教授。龙小宁教授博士毕业于Washington University in Saint Louis经济系，并获有Washington University in Saint Louis和对外经贸大学双硕士学位和西安交通大学学士学位；其主要研究领域为法律经济学、发展经济学和中国经济。龙小宁教授拥有极为出色的发表纪录，在Journal of International Economics, Journal of Public Economics，Management and Organization Review以及Journal of Law and Economics等著名期刊上发表过数十篇论文。
演讲者的CV请见附件。 CV(Long-2016-04-08)
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国际经济学workshop:Revolving door regulation and its impact on Chinese listed firms
发布日期：2016-04-27 08:56 来源：北京大学国家发展研究院
Seminar on International Economics
时间：2016年4月27日（周三）10：30－12：00 am
地点：北大国发院/中国经济研究中心512教室
主持人：余淼杰、余昌华
主讲人：Xiaoning Long 龙小宁 Xiamen University
题目：Revolving door regulation and its impact on Chinese listed firms
摘要：The recent Document No. 18 in China forbids current and retired government officials to hold paid positions in firms and we conduct multiple empirical tests to study the impact of revolving door regulation on Chinese listed firms.
A survival analysis shows that the regulation increased the daily departure rate of independent directors who are targeted officials by 38%. More importantly, an event study based on stock prices of listed firms shows that: (1) The abnormal rate of return for
firms impacted by Document No. 18 is significantly lower than that for other firms, and the drop becomes larger when the window length increases, with the cumulative abnormal rate of return exceeding 3.6% 120 days after the document's issuance; (2) The significant impact of Document 18 on listed firms is observed for both government officials and officials working in universities, implying that the linkage between government and firms has permeated throughout the various sectors in China; and, (3) When dividing official independent directors by their official rankings, government officials affiliated with the People's congress and the Political Consultative Commission are associated with larger effects of Document 18, while university officials with higher rankings tend to experience greater impact.
Finally, we explore how Document 18 affects firm financial performance. Our study produces evidence that sales growth is slower and loan quantity smaller for firms impacted by the document, while R&D expenditure has increased for these firms. These longer-term results suggest that the revolving door regulation may have been effective in cutting off political connections between firms and government and prompting firms to rely more on their own innovation capacity. Combined together, our findings contrast the short-run versus long-run effects of the on-going anti-corruption campaign in China.
主讲人简介：Xiaoning Long 龙小宁现为厦门大学王亚南研究院和经济学院双骋经济学教授，“长江学者”特聘教授。龙小宁教授博士毕业于Washington University in Saint Louis经济系，并获有Washington University in Saint Louis和对外经贸大学双硕士学位和西安交通大学学士学位；其主要研究领域为法律经济学、发展经济学和中国经济。龙小宁教授拥有极为出色的发表纪录，在Journal of International Economics, Journal of Public Economics，Management and Organization Review以及Journal of Law and Economics等著名期刊上发表过数十篇论文。
演讲者的CV请见附件。 CV(Long-2016-04-08)
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