宏观经济学workshop(二）

时间：9月26日10:00-11:30
地点：512教室
标题：Career Concerns, Beijing Style （with Jiahua CHE, Kim-Sau Chung）
演讲嘉宾：乔雪
主持：王敏、赵波
嘉宾简介：
清华大学经济管理学院经济系助理教授。她于1998年获得北京大学经济学学士学位，于2007年获得美国爱荷华州立大学经济学博士 学位。她讲授的课程包括高级宏观经济学，经济学原理和组织设计与人力资源经济学。研究领域主要包括健康与经济发展，劳动力市场流动， 政治经济学。乔老师主持国家自然科学基金项目"失业保险对劳动力市场的影响及其最优设计"，在Journal of Public Economics, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Journal of Economics等国际英文期刊和《经济研究》、《金融研究》、《世界经济》、《南方经济》等国内中文期刊上发表论文。乔老师于2008年与钱颖一教授 一起获得国家优秀课程奖和北京市优秀课程奖，2004年获美国衣阿华州立大学教学优秀奖，2001年获美国衣阿华州立大学学术优秀 奖。为加拿大经济学会，英国皇家经济学会和中西部经济协会会员，并担任Review of Economic Studies, Journal of Population Economics, Public Finance Review, Journal of Comparative Economics, Journal of Economics, China Economic Review, Journal of Family and Economic Issue 等期刊的匿名审稿人。

论文摘要：

We study a model of overlapping principal-agent problems, where one of yesterday's agents would be selected/promoted as today's principal, who then wields absolute power free of checks and balances, and has discretion over how to select/promote one of today's agents as tomorrow's principal. We use this model to theorize how a political system building on career concerns instead of checks and balances may
function. We call this a model of career concerns, Beijing style, which differs fundamentally from one of career concerns, Holmstrom style, in that the disciplinary effect of career concerns exhibits inherent indeterminacy. The proper functioning of such a political system also relies on strong enough state capacity and an intermediate level of decentralization. Small improvement in the rule of law or a mandatory merit-based promotion rule may inadvertently render such a political system unworkable.