国际经济学workshop:Unobservable Investments and Search Frictions

发布日期:2015-11-03 11:19    来源:北京大学国家发展研究院

Seminar on International Economics

时间:2015年11月3日(周二)10:30-12:00 am
地点:北大国发院/中国经济研究中心万众楼一楼大教室
主持人:余淼杰
主讲人:徐语婧(香港大学)

题目:Unobservable Investments and Search Frictions

摘要:This paper develops a pre-entry investment and random search framework to jointly study the investment incentives and trading efficiency. A seller entrant can make unobservable investments to decrease the production cost before searching for buyers. In the unique steady state equilibrium, investment and price dispersion emerge simultaneously with ex ante identical buyers and sellers. Despite the positive investments, when buyers make take-it-or-leave-it offers, the equilibrium payoffs and social welfare are constant given any search friction and equal to the equilibrium values when investments are observable (indicating no investment). This novel property remains true even when the investment strategy becomes socially optimal as search frictions diminish.

主讲人简介:徐语婧博士现为香港大学经济与金融学院助教授。她于2014年在美国加州大学洛杉矶分校(University of California, Los Angeles)获得经济学博士学位。徐语婧博士的研究涉及搜寻理论和应用微观理论。

徐语婧博士的CV 1103_CV_YujingXu 和演讲所用文章 1103_HoldUp2015 请见附件。

 


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