-
首页
-
- 首页
- WORKSHOP预告
管理Workshop:UNDER THE MICROSCOPE: AN EXPERIMENTAL LOOK AT BOARD TRANSPARENCY AND DIRECTOR MONITORING BEHAVIOR
发布日期：2017-11-30 11:18 来源：北京大学国家发展研究院
Time: November 30th, 2017 (Thursday) 12:30 -14:00
Location: Small classroom of Wanzhong Building, National School of Development, Peking U.
Speaker: 李炜文，中山大学管理学院副教授
Abstract
In most advanced economies, the board’s internal decision processes are either undisclosed or disclosed only to a very limited extent. It remains unknown, then, whether directors would behave differently if their behaviors were made public. We find that when their actions are disclosed to the public, directors concerned with their public reputations become more vigilant, whereas those concerned with their prospects for additional board seats become more passive in monitoring corporate insiders. Whereas regulatory bodies and corporate governance watchdogs have recently advocated for greater disclosure of the boardroom decision making process, our study suggests that such mandatory disclosure requirements can exacerbate, rather than alleviate, the problem of passive director monitoring.
Bio
李炜文为中山大学管理学院副教授，主要研究方向包括公司治理、家族企业、以及国际创业。其研究论文被Strategic Management Journal, Journal of International Business Studies，Journal of World Business, Global Strategy Journal等国际期刊接受或发表。他曾获得中国管理研究国际学会（IACMR）最佳宏观论文奖。他是Asia Pacific Journal of Management，Management and Organization Review编委会成员。
国家发展研究院官方微信
Copyright© 1994-2012 北京大学 国家发展研究院 版权所有, 京ICP备05065075号-1
保留所有权利，不经允许请勿挪用
-
首页
-
管理Workshop:UNDER THE MICROSCOPE: AN EXPERIMENTAL LOOK AT BOARD TRANSPARENCY AND DIRECTOR MONITORING BEHAVIOR
发布日期：2017-11-30 11:18 来源：北京大学国家发展研究院
Time: November 30th, 2017 (Thursday) 12:30 -14:00
Location: Small classroom of Wanzhong Building, National School of Development, Peking U.
Speaker: 李炜文，中山大学管理学院副教授
Abstract
In most advanced economies, the board’s internal decision processes are either undisclosed or disclosed only to a very limited extent. It remains unknown, then, whether directors would behave differently if their behaviors were made public. We find that when their actions are disclosed to the public, directors concerned with their public reputations become more vigilant, whereas those concerned with their prospects for additional board seats become more passive in monitoring corporate insiders. Whereas regulatory bodies and corporate governance watchdogs have recently advocated for greater disclosure of the boardroom decision making process, our study suggests that such mandatory disclosure requirements can exacerbate, rather than alleviate, the problem of passive director monitoring.
Bio
李炜文为中山大学管理学院副教授，主要研究方向包括公司治理、家族企业、以及国际创业。其研究论文被Strategic Management Journal, Journal of International Business Studies，Journal of World Business, Global Strategy Journal等国际期刊接受或发表。他曾获得中国管理研究国际学会（IACMR）最佳宏观论文奖。他是Asia Pacific Journal of Management，Management and Organization Review编委会成员。
访问学者申请
EMAIL
北京大学
ENGLISH
