-
首页
-
- 首页
- WORKSHOP预告
微观workshop:Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations and Uninformed Designer
发布日期：2018-05-10 10:13 来源：北京大学国家发展研究院
时间：2018年5月10日（周四）13:30-15:00
地点：北京大学万众楼小教室
主讲人：肖明军（助理教授,武汉大学数理经济与数理金融系）
主持人：汪浩、胡岠
题目：Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations and Uninformed Designer
摘要：In economic environments with incomplete information, economic agents by and large will behave strategically by taking advantage of the information they have in hand. Aligning incentives, inducing agents to reveal their private information truthfully, necessitates sorting conditions in interdependent valuation settings. While many models of the existing literature in mechanism design rely on the fact that the designer knows the details of the environment, namely, the payoff functions of agents and the joint distribution of types, this paper explores a different route by employing “simple mechanisms” that do not require designer know such details of the settings, or sorting conditions. The design idea is motivated by Mezzetti (2004) who proposes a second stage of reporting realized payoffs. When agent's private information has monotonic impact on other agents' payoffs, the current research delivers a two-stage reporting mechanism that virtually implements efficient social choice rule, and other categories of choice rules. The significant property of the mechanism is that the implementation is robust with respect to agents’ beliefs, agents’ knowledge about their opponents and designer’s knowledge about the details of the settings. The robustness properties suggest that this type of mechanisms could have a wide range of applicability whenever values are interdependent and monotonicity condition is met.
主讲人简介：Dr. Mingjun Xiao received his Ph.D. in Economics from the Standford University. Prior to his doctoral study, he obtained her M.Sc. in Economics from Shanghai University of Finance and Economics and BA in Economics from Huazhong University of Science and Technology. His main research interests include Microeconomics Theory, Mechanism Design and Contract Theory.
国家发展研究院官方微信
Copyright© 1994-2012 北京大学 国家发展研究院 版权所有, 京ICP备05065075号-1
保留所有权利，不经允许请勿挪用
-
首页
-
微观workshop:Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations and Uninformed Designer
发布日期：2018-05-10 10:13 来源：北京大学国家发展研究院
时间：2018年5月10日（周四）13:30-15:00
地点：北京大学万众楼小教室
主讲人：肖明军（助理教授,武汉大学数理经济与数理金融系）
主持人：汪浩、胡岠
题目：Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations and Uninformed Designer
摘要：In economic environments with incomplete information, economic agents by and large will behave strategically by taking advantage of the information they have in hand. Aligning incentives, inducing agents to reveal their private information truthfully, necessitates sorting conditions in interdependent valuation settings. While many models of the existing literature in mechanism design rely on the fact that the designer knows the details of the environment, namely, the payoff functions of agents and the joint distribution of types, this paper explores a different route by employing “simple mechanisms” that do not require designer know such details of the settings, or sorting conditions. The design idea is motivated by Mezzetti (2004) who proposes a second stage of reporting realized payoffs. When agent's private information has monotonic impact on other agents' payoffs, the current research delivers a two-stage reporting mechanism that virtually implements efficient social choice rule, and other categories of choice rules. The significant property of the mechanism is that the implementation is robust with respect to agents’ beliefs, agents’ knowledge about their opponents and designer’s knowledge about the details of the settings. The robustness properties suggest that this type of mechanisms could have a wide range of applicability whenever values are interdependent and monotonicity condition is met.
主讲人简介：Dr. Mingjun Xiao received his Ph.D. in Economics from the Standford University. Prior to his doctoral study, he obtained her M.Sc. in Economics from Shanghai University of Finance and Economics and BA in Economics from Huazhong University of Science and Technology. His main research interests include Microeconomics Theory, Mechanism Design and Contract Theory.
访问学者申请
EMAIL
北京大学
ENGLISH
