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北京大学国家发展研究院

微观理论workshop：Communication in Collective Bargaining

发布日期：2017-05-11 04:49    来源：北京大学国家发展研究院

时间：2017年5月11日（周四）14:00-15:30

地点：北京大学国家发展研究院艺园办公区三楼会议室

主讲人：陈济冬Jidong Chen（北京师范大学经济与工商管理学院讲师）

主持人：汪浩、胡岠

题目：Communication in Collective Bargaining

摘要：We analyze how institutions shape communication incentives in a legislative bargaining game. Legislators are privately informed about their ideal points in one-dimensional policy space. In one setting, cheap-talk communication precedes a take-it-or-leave-it agenda-setting game. The second involves sequential agenda setting in which the setter can revise the proposal only when the first one fails to gain enough support. The latter institution requires the setter to commit to a policy as a screening technology. The commitment fosters information disclosure from strategic voters and thus results in efficiency gains over straw polls, where the setter is not constrained in how she reacts to revealed information. With a focus on monotone equilibrium, we also find that simple majority rule sometimes induces no information disclosure in the cheap-talk stage, while unanimity rule always induces information disclosure.

主讲人主页：

http://jidongchen.weebly.com


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