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国际经济学workshop：TARGETED RESERVE REQUIREMENTS FOR MACROECONOMIC STABILIZATION
发布日期：2021-10-19 12:00 来源：
时间：2021年10月19日（周二）10:30-noon
主持人：余淼杰、余昌华
主讲人：Mark M. Spiegel, Senior Policy Advisor in the Economic Research Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, Co-editor of Journal of International Money and Finance
线下：北京大学承泽园249教室
线上：加入Zoom会议：https://zoom.com.cn/j/92638897210?pwd=d1pkemQ3d2MrSmZLNzJmTzdCOCtBUT09
会议号：926 3889 7210
密码：908060
摘要：We study the effectiveness of target reserve requirements (RR) for large versus small banks for macroeconomic stabilization. Such policy was implemented in China during the global financial crisis in 2008 and again during its 2018 slowdown and the COVID-19 pandemic periods. In our model, firms with idiosyncratic productivity borrow from two types of banks—local or national—to finance working capital and faces a credit spread stemming from equilibrium defaults. National banks face lower funding costs, while local banks have better monitoring technologies. Since switching banks incurs a fixed cost, firms would switch banks only if they face large shocks. This environment creates room for stabilizing policies through targeted RR adjustments. In particular, with sufficiently large shocks, an asymmetric feedback rule with differential RR adjustments is more effective for macroeconomic stabilization than a symmetric policy rule. Our analysis complements recent policy discussions concerning disparate capital requirements for large and small banks based on macro-prudential motivations.
主讲人简介:
Mark Spiegel is the Senior Policy Advisor in research department of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, and previously served as the Vice President in the Finance and International Research sections and as the Director of the bank’s Center for Pacific Basin Studies. Prior to joining the Federal Reserve, he served as an assistant professor in the Department of Economics at New York University. He has served as a visiting professor in the Economics Department of U.C. Berkeley, as well as a lecturer at the Haas School of Business at U.C. Berkeley and the University of Wisconsin, Madison. He has also served as a consultant at the World Bank, and as a visiting scholar at the Bank of Japan. Dr. Spiegel received his Ph.D. in economics from the U.C.L.A. and his B.A. from the University of California at Berkeley. He has published numerous articles in both academic and policy-oriented journals on international financial issues and on economic issues associated with Asian economies. His article, “Capital Controls and Optimal Chinese Monetary Policy,” co-authored with Chun Chang and Zheng Liu, won the Sun Yefang award, the top Chinese economics prize, in 2016. He is currently on the editorial board of the Journal of International Money and Finance, and previously served as associate editor of the journal Japan and the World Economy.
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国际经济学workshop：TARGETED RESERVE REQUIREMENTS FOR MACROECONOMIC STABILIZATION
发布日期：2021-10-19 12:00 来源：
时间：2021年10月19日（周二）10:30-noon
主持人：余淼杰、余昌华
主讲人：Mark M. Spiegel, Senior Policy Advisor in the Economic Research Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, Co-editor of Journal of International Money and Finance
线下：北京大学承泽园249教室
线上：加入Zoom会议：https://zoom.com.cn/j/92638897210?pwd=d1pkemQ3d2MrSmZLNzJmTzdCOCtBUT09
会议号：926 3889 7210
密码：908060
摘要：We study the effectiveness of target reserve requirements (RR) for large versus small banks for macroeconomic stabilization. Such policy was implemented in China during the global financial crisis in 2008 and again during its 2018 slowdown and the COVID-19 pandemic periods. In our model, firms with idiosyncratic productivity borrow from two types of banks—local or national—to finance working capital and faces a credit spread stemming from equilibrium defaults. National banks face lower funding costs, while local banks have better monitoring technologies. Since switching banks incurs a fixed cost, firms would switch banks only if they face large shocks. This environment creates room for stabilizing policies through targeted RR adjustments. In particular, with sufficiently large shocks, an asymmetric feedback rule with differential RR adjustments is more effective for macroeconomic stabilization than a symmetric policy rule. Our analysis complements recent policy discussions concerning disparate capital requirements for large and small banks based on macro-prudential motivations.
主讲人简介:
Mark Spiegel is the Senior Policy Advisor in research department of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, and previously served as the Vice President in the Finance and International Research sections and as the Director of the bank’s Center for Pacific Basin Studies. Prior to joining the Federal Reserve, he served as an assistant professor in the Department of Economics at New York University. He has served as a visiting professor in the Economics Department of U.C. Berkeley, as well as a lecturer at the Haas School of Business at U.C. Berkeley and the University of Wisconsin, Madison. He has also served as a consultant at the World Bank, and as a visiting scholar at the Bank of Japan. Dr. Spiegel received his Ph.D. in economics from the U.C.L.A. and his B.A. from the University of California at Berkeley. He has published numerous articles in both academic and policy-oriented journals on international financial issues and on economic issues associated with Asian economies. His article, “Capital Controls and Optimal Chinese Monetary Policy,” co-authored with Chun Chang and Zheng Liu, won the Sun Yefang award, the top Chinese economics prize, in 2016. He is currently on the editorial board of the Journal of International Money and Finance, and previously served as associate editor of the journal Japan and the World Economy.
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