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微观理论Workshop:On Competition in Linear Persuasion Games
发布日期：2023-10-19 12:00 来源：
时间：10月19日（周四）10:30 a.m.-12:00
地点：承泽园329
主讲人：孙君泽（武汉大学经济与管理学院助理教授）
主持老师：吴泽南，石凡奇（经院）；胡岠（国发院）
参与老师：胡涛，吴泽南，石凡奇（经院）；汪浩，胡岠，邢亦青（国发院）；翁翕，刘烁（光华）
题目: On Competition in Linear Persuasion Games
摘要：We study competition in persuasion with multiple senders in linear Bayesian persuasion games, where senders' payoffs depend only on the receiver's posterior expectation about a uni-dimensional state. Using the duality method for linear persuasion (Dworczak and Martini, 2019), we derive a partial geometric characterization for the minimally informative equilibrium outcomes. Building on this, we identify a sufficient and necessary condition that ensures full information disclosure as the unique equilibrium outcome. We apply this condition to a game in which multiple senders compete in persuading a privately informed receiver to take a binary action. There, we show that a strong conflict of interests between senders is neither sufficient nor necessary to robustly – i.e., independently of the distributions of the state and the receiver's private type – induce full disclosure as the unique equilibrium outcome. We provide economically meaningful sufficient conditions for such robust full disclosure. Finally, we derive sufficient conditions that ensure a receiver to be strictly better off by exploiting senders' competition instead of consulting any single sender.
主讲人介绍：Junze Sun is an associate research fellow (untenured associate professor) at the School of Economics and Management, Wuhan University. He obtained his PhD in economics from the University of Amsterdam in 2019. Before joining Wuhan University, he worked as a Max Weber postdoctoral research fellow at the European University Institute. His research interests lie in microeconomic theory, information economics, political economics, as well as behavioral and experimental economics. His current research mainly focuses on two themes: strategic provision and effects of information in elections, and strategic information transmission in sender-receiver games. His papers have been accepted for publication or requested for revision at various journals, including Games and Economics Behavior, Journal of Public Economic Theory, and the Economic Journal.
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首页
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微观理论Workshop:On Competition in Linear Persuasion Games
发布日期：2023-10-19 12:00 来源：
时间：10月19日（周四）10:30 a.m.-12:00
地点：承泽园329
主讲人：孙君泽（武汉大学经济与管理学院助理教授）
主持老师：吴泽南，石凡奇（经院）；胡岠（国发院）
参与老师：胡涛，吴泽南，石凡奇（经院）；汪浩，胡岠，邢亦青（国发院）；翁翕，刘烁（光华）
题目: On Competition in Linear Persuasion Games
摘要：We study competition in persuasion with multiple senders in linear Bayesian persuasion games, where senders' payoffs depend only on the receiver's posterior expectation about a uni-dimensional state. Using the duality method for linear persuasion (Dworczak and Martini, 2019), we derive a partial geometric characterization for the minimally informative equilibrium outcomes. Building on this, we identify a sufficient and necessary condition that ensures full information disclosure as the unique equilibrium outcome. We apply this condition to a game in which multiple senders compete in persuading a privately informed receiver to take a binary action. There, we show that a strong conflict of interests between senders is neither sufficient nor necessary to robustly – i.e., independently of the distributions of the state and the receiver's private type – induce full disclosure as the unique equilibrium outcome. We provide economically meaningful sufficient conditions for such robust full disclosure. Finally, we derive sufficient conditions that ensure a receiver to be strictly better off by exploiting senders' competition instead of consulting any single sender.
主讲人介绍：Junze Sun is an associate research fellow (untenured associate professor) at the School of Economics and Management, Wuhan University. He obtained his PhD in economics from the University of Amsterdam in 2019. Before joining Wuhan University, he worked as a Max Weber postdoctoral research fellow at the European University Institute. His research interests lie in microeconomic theory, information economics, political economics, as well as behavioral and experimental economics. His current research mainly focuses on two themes: strategic provision and effects of information in elections, and strategic information transmission in sender-receiver games. His papers have been accepted for publication or requested for revision at various journals, including Games and Economics Behavior, Journal of Public Economic Theory, and the Economic Journal.
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