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管理学Workshop：Indirect Cronyism and lts Underlying Exchange Logic
发布日期：2023-11-03 12:00 来源：
时间：2023年10月27日10：00
地点：承泽园333
Speaker: 陈晓萍
Abstract:
Indirect cronyism is a phenomenon in which managers show favoritism to indirect guanxihu subordinates who have informal, particular, and personal connection with a third party (e.g., another manager) and demonstrate its prevalent existence in Chinese organizations. We explore the crucial factors that may exacerbate managers to engage in indirect cronyism, and the downstream consequences on other members of the organization. We draw on the indirect reciprocity logic embedded in social exchange theory to predict two underlying motives to explain why managers engage in indirect cronyism: (a) fulfilling their felt obligation to favor the indirect guanxihu subordinate, and (b) strengthening their own guanxi with the third party. Results from three scenario-based experiments and one field study sampling a total of 1,559 working adults provide consistent support for our theoretical reasoning and hypotheses. We discuss the theoretical contributions this paper makes to advance the guanxi and cronyism literature, as well as the practical implications of our findings in Chinese organizations and beyond.
Introduction of Speaker
陈晓萍，美国伊利诺大学组织和社会心理学博士美国管理学会会士(AOM Fellow)、美国心理科学学会会士(APA Fellow )，美国华盛顿大学福斯特商学院组织管理学Philip M.Condit讲席教授曾任福斯特商学院副院长(2016-2020 )和组织管理系主任(2009-2015)。目前担任Management and Organization Review (《组织管理研究》) 的主编，和中英文双语杂志《管理视野》(Management Insights)的创刊和执行主编陈晓萍教授的学术研究被广泛引用，是全球科学研究者中名列2%的高引学者。其学术领域集中于组织行为和人力资源管理，研究课题包括跨文化管理、个体和群体决策、领导力、管理沟通、商业谈判、创业者激情、和中国人的关系等。
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管理学Workshop：Indirect Cronyism and lts Underlying Exchange Logic
发布日期：2023-11-03 12:00 来源：
时间：2023年10月27日10：00
地点：承泽园333
Speaker: 陈晓萍
Abstract:
Indirect cronyism is a phenomenon in which managers show favoritism to indirect guanxihu subordinates who have informal, particular, and personal connection with a third party (e.g., another manager) and demonstrate its prevalent existence in Chinese organizations. We explore the crucial factors that may exacerbate managers to engage in indirect cronyism, and the downstream consequences on other members of the organization. We draw on the indirect reciprocity logic embedded in social exchange theory to predict two underlying motives to explain why managers engage in indirect cronyism: (a) fulfilling their felt obligation to favor the indirect guanxihu subordinate, and (b) strengthening their own guanxi with the third party. Results from three scenario-based experiments and one field study sampling a total of 1,559 working adults provide consistent support for our theoretical reasoning and hypotheses. We discuss the theoretical contributions this paper makes to advance the guanxi and cronyism literature, as well as the practical implications of our findings in Chinese organizations and beyond.
Introduction of Speaker
陈晓萍，美国伊利诺大学组织和社会心理学博士美国管理学会会士(AOM Fellow)、美国心理科学学会会士(APA Fellow )，美国华盛顿大学福斯特商学院组织管理学Philip M.Condit讲席教授曾任福斯特商学院副院长(2016-2020 )和组织管理系主任(2009-2015)。目前担任Management and Organization Review (《组织管理研究》) 的主编，和中英文双语杂志《管理视野》(Management Insights)的创刊和执行主编陈晓萍教授的学术研究被广泛引用，是全球科学研究者中名列2%的高引学者。其学术领域集中于组织行为和人力资源管理，研究课题包括跨文化管理、个体和群体决策、领导力、管理沟通、商业谈判、创业者激情、和中国人的关系等。
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