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微观Workshop: All Pay Quality-Bids in Score Procurement Auctions
发布日期：2023-11-24 12:00 来源：
时间：11月24日（周五）10:30 a.m.-12:00
地点：北京大学经济学院302
主讲人：Jingfeng Lu（Professor, National University of Singapore）
主持老师：吴泽南，石凡奇（经院）；胡岠（国发院）
参与老师：胡涛，吴泽南，石凡奇（经院）；汪浩，胡岠，邢亦青（国发院）；翁翕，刘烁（光华）
题目: All Pay Quality-Bids in Score Procurement Auctions
摘要：We study score procurement auctions with all-pay quality bids, in which a supplier’s score is the difference between his quality and price bids. Equilibrium quality and price bids are solved without first obtaining the corresponding equilibrium scores. In particular, our approach accommodates the case with minimum score requirement. When the convex effect cost function takes a power form, a higher all-pay component of the quality bid reduces quality provision, total surplus and suppliers’ payoffs, but may increase or decrease the procurer’s payoff. If the procurer reimburses the all-pay components of losing suppliers or all suppliers, this would increase quality provision and suppliers’ payoffs, but reduce total surplus and the procurer’s payoff. Finally, we reply on our approach to identify the procurer-optimal score rule, which is quasi-linear in quality and price.
主讲人介绍：Jingfeng Lu is a professor of economics at the National University of Singapore. He is mainly an applied theorist working on auctions, contests, and mechanism design. He is also interested in empirics in auctions and contests. His papers have appeared in the American Economic Review, Journal of Economic Theory, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, International Economic Review, Rand Journal of Economics, Journal of Public Economics, Games and Economic Behavior, and Economic Theory, among many other well-respected journals. He is currently an associate editor for the Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization and the Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design.
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微观Workshop: All Pay Quality-Bids in Score Procurement Auctions
发布日期：2023-11-24 12:00 来源：
时间：11月24日（周五）10:30 a.m.-12:00
地点：北京大学经济学院302
主讲人：Jingfeng Lu（Professor, National University of Singapore）
主持老师：吴泽南，石凡奇（经院）；胡岠（国发院）
参与老师：胡涛，吴泽南，石凡奇（经院）；汪浩，胡岠，邢亦青（国发院）；翁翕，刘烁（光华）
题目: All Pay Quality-Bids in Score Procurement Auctions
摘要：We study score procurement auctions with all-pay quality bids, in which a supplier’s score is the difference between his quality and price bids. Equilibrium quality and price bids are solved without first obtaining the corresponding equilibrium scores. In particular, our approach accommodates the case with minimum score requirement. When the convex effect cost function takes a power form, a higher all-pay component of the quality bid reduces quality provision, total surplus and suppliers’ payoffs, but may increase or decrease the procurer’s payoff. If the procurer reimburses the all-pay components of losing suppliers or all suppliers, this would increase quality provision and suppliers’ payoffs, but reduce total surplus and the procurer’s payoff. Finally, we reply on our approach to identify the procurer-optimal score rule, which is quasi-linear in quality and price.
主讲人介绍：Jingfeng Lu is a professor of economics at the National University of Singapore. He is mainly an applied theorist working on auctions, contests, and mechanism design. He is also interested in empirics in auctions and contests. His papers have appeared in the American Economic Review, Journal of Economic Theory, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, International Economic Review, Rand Journal of Economics, Journal of Public Economics, Games and Economic Behavior, and Economic Theory, among many other well-respected journals. He is currently an associate editor for the Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization and the Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design.
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