时间：6月12日（周四）10:30-12:00

地点：北京大学经济学院302

主讲人：Shota Ichihashi（Assistant Professor of Economics at Queen's University）

主持老师：吴泽南，石凡奇（经院）；胡岠（国发院）

参与老师：胡涛，吴泽南，石凡奇（经院）；汪浩，胡岠，邢亦青（国发院）；翁翕，刘烁（光华）

题目:  Mechanism Design and Innovation Incentive for an Ad-Funded Platform

摘要：We study a mechanism design problem in which a platform allocates multiple pieces of heterogeneous content and advertisements to consumers. The platform faces a trade-off: Allocating more content and ads increases advertising revenue, but it also raises information rents and decreases revenue from selling content. Unlike standard monopoly screening, the platform serves consumers with negative virtual types but tailors the content allocation and advertising policy to limit harm to content sales. The optimal mechanism rationalizes real-world contracts used by ad-funded platforms and shows how the platform’s reliance on advertising affects its incentives to invest in content quality.

主讲人介绍：Shota obtained his Ph.D. in Economics from Stanford University in 2018 and currently works at Queen's University as an assistant professor. He specializes in microeconomic theory, especially in the economics of privacy, data, and AI. His papers have been published in journals such as the American Economic Review, Journal of Economic Theory, and RAND Journal of Economics.