The Real Effects of Tournament Incentives: The Case of Firm Innovation

Time：March 17th (Thursday) 10:30 -12noon

Location: Zhifuxuan, National School of Development, Peking U.

Speaker: 田轩，昆吾九鼎讲席教授，五道口金融学院

 

Abstract：

This paper examines the effects of promotion-based tournament incentives for non-CEO executives on corporate innovation. We find that firms with greater tournament incentives, which are measured as the pay gap between the CEO and other executives, are associated with a higher level of patent quantity and quality, innovation efficiency, and patent importance and novelty. An instrumental variable approach suggests that the observed relations are unlikely to be caused by endogeneity in tournament incentives. The attraction of talent and the reduction in excessive board interventions appear two plausible underlying mechanisms through which tournament incentives promote firm innovation. Our paper highlights the importance of inter-executive incentive scheme design in encouraging technological innovation.

 

嘉宾简介：

田轩教授现任清华大学五道口金融学院院长助理、昆吾九鼎讲席教授，兼任清华大学国家金融研究院创业金融与经济增长研究中心主任，中国家族财富研究中心主任，和清华大学五道口金融学院全球金融GFD教育中心学术主任。田轩教授自2014年起担任美国印第安纳大学凯利商学院金融学终身教授(现离岗留职)。田教授于2008年毕业于波士顿学院并获得金融学博士学位，此前分别于2003年获得华盛顿大学经济学硕士学位和2001年北京大学经济学学士学位。

田教授主要的研究领域包括公司金融，风险投资，私募股权，企业创新和股利政策。田轩教授独立撰写的论文 “The Causes and Consequences of Venture Capital Stage Financing” 获得了2011年发表在金融学科顶级期刊 《金融经济期刊》 (Journal of Financial Economics) 上所有公司金融类论文的詹森最佳论文奖。他的另一篇合著文章“Disciplining Delegated Monitors: The Consequences of Failing to Prevent Fraud” 在2012年国际金融管理协会上获得了金融市场与机构领域的最佳论文奖。

田轩教授现担任国际顶尖管理学杂志《Management Science》的副主编，同时还担任《Journal of Banking and Finance》,《International Review of Finance》, 《Financial Review》,  《Asia-Pacific Journal of Financial Studies》 的副主编及《International Review of Finance》创业金融与企业创新专刊联席主编。