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发展经济学workshop:The Enemies Within: Loyalty, Faction and Elite Competition under Authoritarianism
发布日期：2016-12-07 02:53 来源：北京大学国家发展研究院
时间：2016年12月7日10:15-11:45
地点：国家发展研究院512教室
主讲人：Jean Hong from Hong Kong University of Science and Technology
Title: The Enemies Within: Loyalty, Faction and Elite Competition under Authoritarianism
Abstract: Loyalty is a permanent concern to dictators. It is unclear, however, whether loyalty to a dictator is enough to assure the ruling group’s cohesiveness. In this study, we argue that authoritarian elites, while remaining loyal to their superior, often risk group interests to maximize their self-interest under authoritarian competition. Elites within one authoritarian faction thus tend to compete intensely rather than cooperate, in order to outrival their peers. To empirically test our argument, we collect data on Chinese provincial leaders and exploit all media reports in regional newspapers from 2000 to 2014 on corruption investigations and major industrial accidents. We find that Chinese political elites are more likely to promote negative news related to their faction peers than they are to promote similar news regarding other faction members. We also find that negative news reports indeed reduce the promotion probability of reported cadres, while increasing that of reporting ones.
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发展经济学workshop:The Enemies Within: Loyalty, Faction and Elite Competition under Authoritarianism
发布日期：2016-12-07 02:53 来源：北京大学国家发展研究院
时间：2016年12月7日10:15-11:45
地点：国家发展研究院512教室
主讲人：Jean Hong from Hong Kong University of Science and Technology
Title: The Enemies Within: Loyalty, Faction and Elite Competition under Authoritarianism
Abstract: Loyalty is a permanent concern to dictators. It is unclear, however, whether loyalty to a dictator is enough to assure the ruling group’s cohesiveness. In this study, we argue that authoritarian elites, while remaining loyal to their superior, often risk group interests to maximize their self-interest under authoritarian competition. Elites within one authoritarian faction thus tend to compete intensely rather than cooperate, in order to outrival their peers. To empirically test our argument, we collect data on Chinese provincial leaders and exploit all media reports in regional newspapers from 2000 to 2014 on corruption investigations and major industrial accidents. We find that Chinese political elites are more likely to promote negative news related to their faction peers than they are to promote similar news regarding other faction members. We also find that negative news reports indeed reduce the promotion probability of reported cadres, while increasing that of reporting ones.
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