Table of Content 期刊目录

1. Time-varying transmission effects of external shocks into inflation: how different is China from Korea?

Seo Hyeong Lee & Shiyou Zhu

Pages 1-16

 

2. Can China escape the middle-income trap?

Yiping Huang

Pages 17-33

 

3. Explosive bubbles in the US–China exchange rate? Evidence from right-tailed unit root tests

Ghassen El Montasser, John Fry & Nicholas Apergis

Pages 34-46

 

4. The potential impact of China–US BIT on China’s manufacturing sectors

Miaojie Yu & Fan Zhang

Pages 47-64

 

5. Measurement matters: understanding China’s growth rates

Daili Wang

Pages 65-74

 

6. Where have China’s state monopolies gone?

Paul Hubbard

Pages 75-99

 

Article Abstract 文章摘要

2. Time-varying transmission effects of external shocks into inflation: how different is China from Korea?

Seo Hyeong Lee & Shiyou Zhu

Pages 1-16

Abstract: This article examined the time-varying effects of external shocks that determine inflation on Chinese and Korean consumer price index (CPI) inflation, using data from the period 2010:1 to 2013:4. For this experimentation, we adopted the Kalman filter algorithm. Key findings include the following: first, the lagged CPI inflation is the main determinant of inflation rate in both China and Korea that is significant and has positive effects. Second, as expected, the effects of independent variables on CPI inflation rate have a considerable difference in China and Korea from the coefficients’ size and sign. Especially, China’s CPI inflation is mainly affected by domestic output growth, while Korea is more readily affected by external shocks. Third, we confirmed the time-varying effects. For instance, the positive effect of the output variable is decreasing in the Chinese inflation equation, but its negative effect is decreasing in the Korean inflation equation. Finally, we can guess Korea is a more import dependent economy than China and also the trends of estimated coefficients of China’s inflation are changing similarly to Korea. It has been proved from recent changes that there is a decreasing effect of output growth, but negatively and increasing effects of exchange rate and import dependence. Hence, those recent changes imply that this is caused by the change of the Chinese economy to be more trade dependent as well as we cannot deny the possibility of the external factors that play a role in CPI inflation, and its influence is gradually increasing in China. 
Link to the original text:
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17538963.2015.1121684

 

2. Can China escape the middle-income trap?

Yiping Huang

Pages 17-33

Abstract: Can China continue its relatively rapid economic growth and rise to the high-income status in the coming decade? In this article we address this question by examining three issues. One, is the current slowdown mainly a cyclical or a structural phenomenon? Two, can China successfully transform its growth model? And, three, what does China need to do to foster its capability of technological innovation and industrial upgrading? We conclude that, with necessary reforms, such as improvement in the education and research capability, liberalization of the financial system and introduction of a more transparent and accountable political system, China will most likely be able to escape the middle-income trap in the next 10 years.

Link to the original text:

http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17538963.2015.1122882

 

3. Explosive bubbles in the US–China exchange rate? Evidence from right-tailed unit root tests

Ghassen El Montasser, John Fry & Nicholas Apergis

Pages 34-46

Abstract: In this article we apply novel right-tailed unit root (sup Augmented Dickey-Fuller (SADF) and generalized sup ADF) tests to the China–US exchange rate. The empirical results document that the recent financial crisis in 2008 may be preceded by early warning signs of exuberance. Using the SADF test, evidence of an explosive behavior in the nominal exchange is found from 2005 onwards. This period coincides with both financial reforms in China and early indications of an impending US crisis that both have been reported in the literature. Our findings suggest that such an explosive behavior may be attributable to differences in the relative prices of traded goods. Policy implications are also derived.

Link to the original text:

http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17538963.2015.1125591

 

4. The potential impact of China–US BIT on China’s manufacturing sectors

Miaojie Yu & Fan Zhang

Pages 47-64

Abstract: This article finds that the overall effect of the foreign direct investment (FDI) and thereby the China–US bilateral investment treaties (BIT) on Chinese manufacturing sector is positive, which raises the productivity and profitability of the firms, using various econometric models and other evidence. The manufacturing sector as a whole has already opened up to the world economy and needs to continue this process. The industries in the manufacturing sector do not need to be protected, except for in limited fields related to national security, scarce natural resources and well-defined strategic sectors. Gradual lifting of the protection may be needed in the short-run for a small number of vulnerable sectors. A moderate relaxing of the current restrictions will increase FDI in manufacturing from all countries by 4–8% under different assumptions. This effect will be small when only considering FDI from the USA. Domestic firms need to update their technology, reduce costs and learn management skills from their foreign competitors, while using the national treatment terms in BIT to enter the fields that are not open to domestic firms under current regulations. Domestic firms also need to set up firm-level global strategies and reallocate firms’ resources according to the changing investment environment, taking advantage of profit opportunities outside the domestic markets.

Link to the original text:

http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17538963.2015.1126973

 

5. Measurement matters: understanding China’s growth rates

Daili Wang

Pages 65-74

Abstract: The recent decline in year-on-year (y/y) growth rate has sparked fear of a China ‘hard landing’. However, the literature found that y/y measures can be inadequate in catching cyclical turning points, especially when, as now in China, a short, sharp deceleration has occurred but bottomed out within the past 12 months. We regard three-month/three-month seasonally adjusted annualized growth rates (QSAA) as a better leading indicator for identifying patterns than y/y growth rates given that QSAA not only irons out very short-term volatility by taking a three-month moving average, it summarizes information from the previous six months (y/y indicators only exhibit the latest data point and information 12 months ago). Based on a sample of six important Chinese economic indicators, we find the new measure shows a different growth trajectory relative to that measured by the y/y growth rate. Thus, policy makers may find the new measures complementary to the widely used y/y growth rates in decision making.

Link to the original text:

http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17538963.2015.1132816

 

6. Where have China’s state monopolies gone?

Paul Hubbard

Pages 75-99

Abstract: If China’s economy is an example of “state-capitalism,” then its large, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) could be expected to monopolize key sectors. But previous estimates of industrial concentration, using the Herfindahl—Hirschman Index (HHI), have suggested that the level of industrial concentration—and therefore the potential for the abuse of monopoly power—is very low. These studies have significantly underestimated HHI, since they do not consolidate subsidiary enterprises in Chinese survey data into larger business groups, or according to ultimate ownership. After making these adjustments, a measure of potential HHI shows that large state monopolies remain in oil and gas, electricity, tobacco and, potentially, automobiles. In particular, SOEs supervised by the central government are heavily invested in potentially concentrated industries. But aggregate profits of the state sector are driven more by the portfolio distribution of assets between resources, manufacturing and utilities, rather than industrial concentration within sectors.

Link to the original text:

http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17538963.2016.1138695